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The Sandelian Republic and 
the Encumbered Self 
Richard Dagger 
In Democracy's Discontent, Michael Sandel argues for a revival of the 
republican tradition in order to counteract the pernicious effects of contemporary 
liberalism. As in his earlier work, Sandel charges that liberals who embrace the 
ideals of political neutrality and the unencumbered self are engaged in a self- 
subverting enterprise, for no society that lives by these ideals can sustain itself. 
Sandel is right to endorse the republican emphasis on forming citizens and 
cultivating civic virtues. By opposing liberalism as vigorously as he does, however, 
he engages in a self-subverting enterprise of his own. That is, Sandel is in danger 
of undercutting his position by threatening the liberal principles upon which he 
implicitly relies. This danger is greatest when he presses his case against the 
unencumbered self, when he appeals to the obligations of membership, and when 
he treats republicanism and liberalism as adversaries rather than allies. 
In the 1980s Michael Sandel established himself as a leading 
critic of liberalism. His Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, published 
in 1982, almost in tandem with Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, 
helped to launch the communitarian challenge to liberalism.1 Two 
years later he published a collection of essays, Liberalism and Its 
Critics, and an influential article, "The Procedural Republic and 
the Unencumbered Self," in which he argued that the defects of 
contemporary liberalism had seeped from theory into practice in 
the United States.2 Ideas have consequences, he insisted, and the 
James Farr's invitation to participate in a panel on "Sandel and His Critics" 
prompted me to write this paper and present an earlier version of it at the 1998 
meeting of Midwest Political Science Association. I am grateful to Professor Farr 
and to Terence Ball, the anonymous referees for The Review of Politics, and my 
colleagues in the ASUMPL reading group, especially Avital Simhony, for their 
advice and encouragement. 
1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982; 2nd ed. 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Further references to Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice appear in the text, in parentheses, as LLJ. 
2. Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and Its Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); 
Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 
12 (1984): 81-96, and reprinted in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., 
Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 
12-28, from which I shall quote. Further references to "The Procedural Republic 
and the Unencumbered Self" appear in the text, in parentheses, as "PR." 
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misguided ideas of contemporary liberals have had the conse- 
quence of weakening the American polity. "This is the sense," 
Sandel wrote, "in which philosophy inhabits the world from 
the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of 
theory" ("PR," p. 12). 
Those same words appear in the preface to Professor Sandel's 
new book, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy.3 Indeed, the first two sentences of "The Procedural 
Republic and the Unencumbered Self" are also the first two sen- 
tences of the preface to Democracy's Discontent. These are but the 
first of many signs that Democracy's Discontent is "The Procedural 
Republic" writ large-an attempt to fill out the picture of our pro- 
cedural republic that he had sketched in the article. Thus Sandel 
devotes most of the book to the historical enterprise of tracing the 
ways in which "the civic or formative aspect of our politics has 
largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free 
and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they 
have not chosen" (DD, p. 6). The historical detail is new, but the 
fundamental complaint is the same in the book as it was in the 
article: "The public philosophy by which we live cannot secure 
the liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of 
community and civic engagement that liberty requires" (DD, p. 6).4 
But that is not to say that the historical detail is the only new 
element in Democracy's Discontent. Another is Sandel's adherence 
to republicanism, which occupies the favorable side of a contrast 
between republicanism and liberalism that is the leitmotif of the 
book. Although he never explains why he now associates himself 
with the republican rather than the communitarian position, the 
answer is probably to be found in a remark from his review of 
John Rawls's Political Liberalism: "The term 'communitarian' is 
misleading ... insofar as it implies that rights should rest on the 
values or preferences that prevail in any given community at any 
given time. Few, if any, of those who have challenged the priority 
3. Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. ix. Further 
references to this book appear in the text, in parentheses, as DD. 
4. Cp. "Procedural Republic": "But I suspect we would find in the practice of 
the procedural republic two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its philosophy: 
first, a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities; second, a tendency to 
undercut the kind of community on which it none the less depends" (p. 27). 
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of the right are communitarians in this sense."5 To be sure, Sandel 
continues to challenge the priority of the right to the good, as the 
22 entries under this heading in the index attest. But he apparently 
believes that he is in a better position to do this as a republican 
committed to "a formative politics ... that cultivates in citizens 
the qualities of character self-government requires" than as a 
communitarian committed to the prevailing values and 
preferences in a given community at a given time (DD, p. 6). After 
all, those values and preferences may foster ambition, avarice, 
sloth, and other qualities of character quite different from, or even 
hostile to, those that self-government requires. As a republican, 
then, Sandel may be able to resist the charge that he is one of the 
"communitarian critics" of liberalism who "want us to live in 
Salem, but not to believe in witches."6 
Sandel's self-professed republicanism also points to another 
respect in which Democracy's Discontent adds something new to 
the arguments of "The Procedural Republic." By taking republican 
theory and practice as the standard against which liberalism is 
measured and found wanting, Sandel now tells us, by implication, 
what he takes to be an adequate political theory-one that is truly 
capable of providing a public philosophy to inform our political 
practices and institutions. In his final chapter, moreover, he 
provides an account of how we can revive civic life that includes 
prescriptions for fighting Walmart-induced sprawl and reducing 
economic inequality. The account is far from complete, as he 
acknowledges, but it does offer more than a hint of what a 
Sandelian republic of encumbered selves would look like. 
Those who want to know what Sandel is for as well as what 
he is against thus have good reason to welcome Democracy's 
Discontent. If they believe that American politics would benefit 
from a bracing (not to say liberal) dose of republicanism, they 
will also find much that is salutary in the book. As someone who 
counts himself in both of these camps, I believe that Professor 
Sandel has been wise to put some distance between himself and 
5. Michael Sandel, "Political Liberalism," Harvard Law Review 107, no. 7 
(1994): 1767. 
6. Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 14 (1985): 308-22, as reprinted in Avineri and de-Shalit, 
Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 133. In this regard, note Sandel's admission 
(Democracy's Discontent, p. 321) that "bad communities may form bad characters." 
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communitarianism, and wiser still to endorse the republican 
emphasis on forming citizens and cultivating civic virtues. But 
he is wrong to continue to oppose liberalism as vigorously as he 
does, and he is particularly wrong to oppose republicanism to 
liberalism. By doing so he opens himself to a charge that he has 
leveled against those liberals who have embraced the ideals of 
political neutrality and the unencumbered self: that they are 
engaged in a self-subverting enterprise. Just as a liberal society 
must be able to count on a sense of community and civic 
engagement, so the republican polity that Sandel now champions 
must be able to count on a commitment to liberal principles, such 
as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the rights of others. If their 
zeal for individual rights and liberty sometimes leads liberals to 
undercut their position by threatening the communal or republican 
underpinnings of a liberal society, so Sandel is in danger of 
undercutting his position by threatening the liberal principles 
upon which he implicitly relies. This danger is greatest, I shall 
argue, when Sandel presses his case against the unencumbered 
self, when he appeals to the obligations of membership, and when 
he opposes republicanism to liberalism. 
Sandel and the Self 
According to the argument of Liberalism and the Limits of Jus- 
tice, one of the fundamental flaws of deontological liberals in 
general and John Rawls in particular is the doctrine that the self is 
prior to its ends. As Sandel restated Rawls's position, this doc- 
trine holds that "what is most essential to our personhood is not 
the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them. And this 
capacity is located in a self which must be prior to the ends it 
chooses" (LLJ, p. 19). Following a substantial quotation from 
Rawls's A Theory of ustice, Sandel elaborated the doctrine in this way: 
To identify any set of characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and 
so on, is always to imply some subject 'me' standing behind them, and 
the shape of this 'me' must be given prior to any of the ends or attributes 
I bear. As Rawls writes,'even a dominant end must be chosen from among 
numerous possibilities.' And before an end can be chosen, there must be 
a self around to choose it. (LLJ, p. 19; emphasis in original)7 
7. The internal quotation is from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 560. 
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Sandel then went on to argue that this view of the self as choos- 
ing subject prior to its chosen ends is both wrong and pernicious. 
It is wrong because its conception of the self as static and isolated 
is at odds with our self-knowledge, and it is pernicious because 
the distance it puts between self and world forecloses important 
personal and political possibilities. "One consequence of this dis- 
tance," he charged, 
is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it invulnerable, 
to fix its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so 
deeply that I could not understand myself without it. No transformation 
of life purposes and plans could be so unsettling as to disrupt the contours 
of my identity. No project could be so essential that turning away from it 
would call into question the person I am. (LLJ, p. 62) 
Such a self must be disconnected from other people, cut off from 
a community or communities that give it shape, substance, and 
texture. Conceiving the self as prior to its ends thus "rules out the 
possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as 
well as the interests of the participants could be at stake" (LLJ, p. 
62).8 So abstract and disembodied a self must also be shallow, 
"incapable of self-knowledge in any morally serious sense. Where 
the self is unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person 
is left for self-reflection to reflect upon" (LLJ, p. 180; emphasis 
in original). 
These objections to the doctrine of the self as prior to its ends 
recur in "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self." 
There, however, the emphasis is on the pernicious effects of taking 
the self to be unencumbered-effects that have become all too 
evident in the "procedural republic" of the United States. Because 
it is a republic, the procedural republic must rely upon the loyalty 
of citizens who are committed to the common good. But because 
it draws upon a conception of the self as unencumbered, free from 
"moral encumbrances and antecedent obligations," the procedural 
republic is caught in a contradiction, for an unencumbered self is 
incapable of sustaining the necessary loyalty and commitment 
("PR," p. 23). Can we view ourselves, Sandel asked, as 
"independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our 
aims and attachments?" Not, he answered, 
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without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists 
partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding 
ourselves as the particular persons we are-as members of this family 
or community or nation or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens 
of this republic. Allegiances such as these are more than values I happen 
to have, and to hold, at a certain distance. They go beyond the obligations 
I voluntarily incur and the 'natural duties' I owe to human beings as 
such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even 
permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue 
of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, taken 
together, partly define the person I am. ("PR," p. 23)9 
In short, the self-identity of the encumbered self sustains 
republican government by teaching the individual that he or she 
is entangled in a network of unchosen attachments and 
commitments; the self-identity of the unencumbered self 
undercuts republican government by teaching the individual that 
he or she is subject only to obligations freely chosen. To heed those 
philosophers who tell us that the self is prior to its ends is thus to 
follow mistaken theory into self-defeating practice. "Denied the 
expansive self-understandings that could shape a common life, 
the liberal self is left to lurch between detachment on the one hand, 
and entanglement on the other." If this "liberal vision" is "not 
morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it 
officially rejects, then we should expect to find that the political 
practice that embodies this vision is not practically self-sufficient 
either-that it must draw on a sense of community it cannot 
supply and may even undermine" ("PR," p. 24; emphasis in original). 
That this is "the predicament of the unencumbered self- 
lurching, as we left it, between detachment on the one hand, and 
entanglement on the other," is the principal point of "The 
Procedural Republic." That "something like this ... has been 
unfolding in America for the past half-century or so" is the worry 
that concludes the essay ("PR," p. 28). Democracy's Discontent is 
Sandel's attempt to prove that we do indeed have reason to worry 
about the predicament of the unencumbered self. 
In Democracy's Discontent the claim that it is both wrong and 
pernicious to conceive the self as prior to its ends is again at the 
heart of Sandel's analysis and argument. "In recent decades," he 
writes on page six, "the civic or formative aspect of our politics 
9. Cp. ibid., p. 179. 
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has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as 
free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties 
they have not chosen." He makes the same point on page 350, the 
penultimate page of the text: "the image of citizens as free and 
independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties that they 
have not chosen, cannot sustain the public spirit that equips us 
for self-rule." Variations on this theme recur throughout the in- 
tervening pages, especially when Sandel revisits Rawlsiana: "As 
Rawls explained, it is precisely because we are free and indepen- 
dent selves, capable of choosing our ends for ourselves, that we 
need a framework of rights that is neutral among ends.... As the 
right is prior to the good, so the self is prior to its ends" (DD, p. 
290 and 291). 
If Sandel's criticisms of this conception of the self are correct- 
if it does indeed lead us into the "predicament of the 
unencumbered self" ensnared in a self-defeating enterprise-we 
shall then have a compelling reason to look favorably upon the 
Sandelian republic and its encumbered self. But is he right? Does 
the belief that the self is prior to its ends take us inexorably into 
the predicament of the unencumbered self? If it does, it is not for 
the reasons Sandel gives. 
There are three ways in which Sandel's case against the unen- 
cumbered self conceived as prior to its ends fails. The first has to 
do with the justice of Sandel's assessment of Rawls and the other 
"deontological," "procedural," or "voluntarist" liberals who hold 
that the self is prior to its ends. As we have seen, Sandel argues 
that they are wrong because their view of the self is impoverished 
and inaccurate; it cannot account for our sense of ourselves as "self- 
interpreting" and "self-reflective" beings: "Where the self is 
unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person is left for 
self-reflection to reflect upon" (LLJ, p. 180; emphasis in original). 
But there is a vast difference between saying that the self is prior 
to its ends and saying that it is unencumbered. As Will Kymlicka 
explains in his response to Sandel, 
What is central to the liberal view is not that we can perceive a self prior 
to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior to our ends, in 
the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination. ... My 
self is, in this sense, perceived prior to its ends, i.e. I can always envisage 
my self without its present ends. But this doesn't require that I can ever 
perceive a self totally unencumbered by any ends-the process of ethical 
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reasoning is always one of comparing one "encumbered" potential self 
with another "encumbered" potential self.10 
According to Sandel's criticism, the self as Rawls and other 
deontological liberals conceive it is something that exists prior to 
its ends and attachments, all form and no substance until it con- 
stitutes itself by choosing among the ends and attachments 
available to it. If this were the Rawlsian liberal's conception of the 
self, it surely would be as mistaken as Sandel charges. Kymlicka's 
response demonstrates, however, that Sandel's criticism is mis- 
placed. When Rawls and other liberals hold that the self is prior 
to its ends, their point is not that the self precedes its ends in time. 
The claim is not temporal but conceptual. That is, the self is prior 
to its ends in that no self is completely defined or exhausted by its 
ends. If I were somehow to compile a comprehensive catalogue 
of my ends, commitments, and attachments, for example, that 
catalogue would no doubt provide a remarkably broad and deep 
account of who I am: of myself. Yet it would not and could not 
capture everything about my self, for it would not include my 
(self's) ability to add new items to that catalogue while amending 
or discarding others. The self is prior to its ends in this conceptual 
sense, then, even if some of its ends and attachments necessarily 
precede it in the temporal sense. 
This is clearly an important response to Sandel's criticism of 
the (supposedly) liberal conception of the self-constituted self. It 
is especially important in light of Sandel's continued assault in 
Democracy's Discontent on "the liberal conception of citizens as 
freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered by moral or 
civic ties antecedent to choice" (DD, p. 322). That Sandel neglects 
to respond in turn to Kymlicka's response is, as one reviewer of 
Democracy's Discontent has noted, signally disappointing.11 
10. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), pp. 52-53. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 27 and n. 29, where Rawls endorses Kymlicka's response 
to Sandel. 
11. Daniel A. Bell, "Liberal Neutrality and Its Role in American Political Life," 
The Responsive Community 7 (1997): 61-68, esp. p. 62. Nor does Sandel respond to 
Kymlicka or other critics in the second edition of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(cited supra, n. 1), which adds an introduction consisting largely of his review of 
Rawls's Political Liberalism to the original edition. 
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Setting aside the question of the accuracy of Sandel's reading 
of Rawls and company, it is also clear that Sandel's discussion of 
the self suffers from a second, closely-related problem. This is his 
tendency to conflate two distinct senses of "self" and "subject" 
and to slide back and forth between them. The first conception is 
abstract and general; the second is particular and concrete. 
A conception of the self is abstract and general when it tries to 
capture the features common to all selves; it is concrete and par- 
ticular when it refers to features that vary from one self to another. 
The self-the self in the abstract, general sense-is always a part, 
but never the whole, of the particular self that I or you or anyone 
else has. The concrete, particular self is a self that is distinct from 
everyone else's. Self-knowledge, self-identity, and self-reflection 
are all properties of particular, concrete selves, not of the self in 
general. Drawing this distinction thus allows us to say that the 
self is conceptually prior to its ends even though a self-indeed, 
every particular self-is defined or constituted, at least in part, 
by them. 
This, I take it, is Rawls's position. But it also seems to be 
Sandel's. Or perhaps I should say that it is the position that Sandel 
needs to take to make sense of some of his arguments. When he 
speaks of the constitutive conception of community, for instance, 
he is careful to insert the word "partly" at key points: "on the 
constitutive conception, the good of community was seen to 
penetrate the person more profoundly [than on the sentimental 
conception] so as to describe not just his feeling but a mode of 
self-understanding partly constitutive of his identity, partly 
defininitive [sic] of who he was" (LLJ, p. 161; emphasis added to 
"partly"). The same caution is evident when Sandel points to 
"those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, 
taken together, partly define the person I am" ("PR," p. 23; 
emphasis added). Inserting "partly" in these passages seems to 
be Sandel's way of preserving an active role for the self. I am only 
partly defined by my community or by my attachments because I 
am able to reject some practices of the community or to grow out 
of some of my attachments while taking on others. Someone so 
thoroughly absorbed into the ways of his or her community as to 
be unable to think beyond its confines will not be capable of the 
self-reflection and self-understanding that Sandel takes to be the 
hallmark of moral depth or seriousness: "As a self-interpreting 
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being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance 
myselffrom it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, 
the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history 
itself" (LLJ; emphasis added). 
In all of these cases Sandel relies implicitly on the distinction 
between the general and the particular senses of the self. As par- 
ticular selves, that is, we are constituted by community and by 
unchosen attachments, but we are never wholly constituted by 
them. We cannot be, for there is a sense in which a part of any 
particular self is always somehow above or beyond or not con- 
tained in that self's ends, attachments, and commitments. Whether 
it be marked by a capacity to choose, as in Rawls, or a capacity to 
reflect, as Sandel prefers,12 this aspect of the self-the abstract, 
general self-plays an active part in the constitution of a concrete, 
particular self. Indeed, Sandel's description of the capacity for 
reflection bears out this point. 
Unlike the capacity for choice, which enables the self to reach beyond 
itself, the capacity for reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward 
upon itself, to inquire into its constituent nature, to survey its various 
attachments and to acknowledge their respective claims, to sort out the 
bounds-now expansive, now constrained-between the self and the 
other, to arrive at a self-understanding less opaque if never perfectly 
transparent, a subjectivity less fluid if never finally fixed, and so 
gradually, throughout a lifetime, to participate in the constitution of its 
identity. (LLJ, p. 153; emphasis added) 
The capacity for reflection that Sandel writes of here is plainly 
different from the reflective capacity of a mirror. The self that en- 
gages in Sandelian self-reflection must exercise judgment, perhaps 
by deciding which of two conflicting attachments is more vital to 
itself, or perhaps by sorting out the bounds-where they are and 
where they should be-between itself and various others. Even 
self-discovery, as in Elizabeth Bennet's "Till this moment, I never 
knew myself," requires a self capable of self-criticism.13 And none 
12. But note that Rawls also stresses the importance of self-reflection: "each 
person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the 
system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue" (A Theory of Justice, p. 11). 
13. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1932), p. 208. 
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of this is possible unless we can distinguish between two aspects 
or senses of the self. 
Sandel's embrace of republicanism in Democracy's Discontent 
provides further evidence of his implicit reliance on a distinction 
of this sort. A republican living in Salem will be more likely to 
stand against the witch-hunting fervor than a communitarian. 
"Fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread," but a 
republican revival may stem the tide (DD, p. 322). Republicanism 
can do this because republicans aspire to self-government, and 
self-government requires the citizen to participate in making the 
laws that he or she is to obey. And making laws requires those 
active, critical capacities of reflection and judgment that may call 
our communities' norms and our personal attachments into 
question. This is especially true of Sandel's "pluralist version of 
republican politics," which rests on the conviction that "self- 
government works best when sovereignty is dispersed and 
citizenship formed across multiple sites of civic engagements" 
(DD, p. 347). If self-government works best in such circumstances, 
it is probably because the tug of war between the claims of our 
fellow citizens in these multiple sites of civic engagement forces 
us to reflect on their relative merits and to judge-and perhaps to 
choose-between them. 
Sandel is a republican rather than a communitarian because 
he prizes the citizen and the self that are capable of self- 
government. Such a citizen and such a self need not, and for Sandel 
cannot, be wholly self-constituting, but they must be able "to 
participate in the constitution of [their] identity" as citizen and as 
self. But none of this requires us to reject the claim that the self (in 
the abstract, general sense) is prior to its ends. On the contrary, 
even Sandel, as I hope to have shown, implicitly appeals to this 
sense in which the self stands apart from and reflects upon its 
current ends and attachments. 
There is an irony here. For if I am right, one may conceive the 
self as prior to its ends and nevertheless deplore the unencumbered 
self. The self that is prior to its ends is the self in the abstract, 
general sense, and to say that it is prior to its ends tells us little 
about particular selves. Sandel may then implicitly rely on a 
conception of the self that is prior to its ends, as I have suggested, 
yet continue to attack what he takes to be the liberal celebration 
and cultivation of unencumbered selves (in the particular, concrete 
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sense) without contradicting himself. Indeed, he could admit to 
being mistaken about the priority of the self to its ends without 
retreating at all from his criticism of "the liberal conception of 
persons as unencumbered selves independent of their roles and 
unbound by moral ties they choose to reject" (DD, p. 112). His 
task would then be to prove, first, that liberalism does indeed 
produce such unencumbered selves and, second, that these selves 
(in the particular, concrete sense) are indeed incapable of 
sustaining the loyalty and commitment that republican self- 
government requires. 
I am prepared to concede Sandel the second point, but not the 
first. Some of the reasons for my disagreement will appear below, 
in Part III, but for now I want to challenge his account of encum- 
bered and unencumbered selves. For this is the third respect in 
which Sandel's criticism of the unencumbered self conceived as 
prior to its ends is off the mark. 
In this case the problem is that Sandel trades on a false 
dichotomy between encumbered and unencumbered selves. As 
Sandel insists, the liberal image of the unencumbered self is false 
and misleading because no self (in the particular, concrete sense) 
can truly be unencumbered. We all derive some substantial part 
of our identities from communities and attachments that somehow 
encumber us. So it is not the unencumbered self that is the problem, 
but the pernicious belief that we can or should become 
unencumbered. That is why Sandel decries "the liberal conception 
of citizens as freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered 
by moral or civic ties antecedent to choice"; that is why he deplores 
"the voluntarist project of contemporary liberalism," according 
to which "the ideal American citizen would think and act as a kind 
of universal person, unencumbered by particular identities and 
attachments" (DD, p. 322, p. 283; emphasis added to both 
quotations). People who are encouraged to believe, by political 
rhetoric and legal decisions, that they are truly unencumbered 
selves will try to live as if they were, with results that can only be 
disastrous for republican self-government. 
But if the image or ideal or conception of the unencumbered 
self is false and misleading because there can be no such self (in 
the particular, concrete sense), then the dichotomy between the 
encumbered and unencumbered self must also be false. Rather 
than posing the problem as a choice between two competing 
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conceptions of the self, encumbered or unencumbered, as Sandel 
does, we should recognize that all selves (in the particular, concrete 
sense) must be encumbered to a greater or lesser degree. Sandel 
might respond that it is still worthwhile to draw a distinction 
between the encumbered and unencumbered selves as ideals. Yet 
even as an ideal the self he calls unencumbered is really only a 
less thoroughly or more lightly encumbered self. We are dealing 
with a continuum, not a dichotomy. Somewhere between the 
impossibly unencumbered self and the self so completely 
encumbered that it is unable to engage in critical reflection lies 
the properly encumbered self-one that is capable of thinking 
freely and independently without ignoring or disavowing what 
it has gained from and owes to others. Locating the space in which 
that properly encumbered self can thrive should be a central 
concern of all those who advocate self-government, liberals and 
republicans alike. 
Drawing a sharp distinction between encumbered and 
unencumbered selves, as Sandel does, directs our attention away 
from this central concern. It leads him, for example, to associate 
autonomy with the liberal image of the unencumbered self when 
he clearly needs to enlist it on the side of his republicanism. To be 
autonomous is to be in some sense self-governing, subject to laws 
or rules that one gives to oneself. When he places autonomy on 
the liberal side of his encumbered/unencumbered dichotomy, 
however, Sandel seems to imply that the encumbered selves on 
his republican side must be characterized by heteronomy. "For 
the unencumbered self, not honor but dignity is the basis of 
respect-the dignity that consists in the capacity of persons as 
autonomous agents to choose their ends for themselves" (DD, p. 
82). By implication, then, the encumbered self must find its basis 
of respect not in dignity but in honor-the honor that consists in 
playing the part of heteronomous beings who have their ends 
chosen for them. 
But that cannot be what Sandel, as a self-professed republi- 
can, means by the encumbered self. Such a self must be capable, 
in concert with others, of self-government, and in that sense such a 
self must be autonomous. As with encumbered and unencum- 
bered selves, autonomy and heteronomy are not the two sides of 
a dichotomy. Autonomy is a matter of degree, something that one 
may enjoy to a greater or lesser extent. It is also something that 
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the self (in the particular, concrete sense) does not acquire all on 
its own, for it is a capacity that must be developed with the help 
of others before it can be exercised.14 But it must be exercised if 
self-government is to be possible. 
To this complaint Sandel or his defenders could reply that his 
attack on the liberal conception of autonomy need not entail a 
commitment to heteronomy.15 Instead, Sandel's criticism could be 
aimed at what he takes to be a misconception of autonomy that 
stands in need of correction. Sandel might then have his own, 
republican conception of autonomy-the autonomy of the encum- 
bered self that governs itself in the full awareness of how much it 
owes to the community that partly constitutes its identity-to of- 
fer as a superior alternative to liberal autonomy. If something of 
this sort does lie behind Sandel's criticism of liberal autonomy in 
Democracy's Discontent, however, it is obscured by Sandel's per- 
sistent association of autonomy with the errors of voluntarist or 
procedural liberalism. As matters now stand, his republicanism, 
with its implicit appeal to a conception of autonomy, is at odds 
with his indictment of such "comprehensive liberal ideals as au- 
tonomy or individuality" (DD, p. 100). 
Sandel's tendency to link autonomy to the liberal image of 
the free, independent, and unencumbered self is an example of 
the larger problems of his analysis of the self. For this "liberal 
image" is not one that Rawls and Rawlsian liberals have adopted 
as an account of the particular, concrete self; nor does it follow 
from the claim that the self in the abstract, general sense is prior 
to its ends; nor does it provide one side of a dichotomy between 
autonomous and unencumbered selves, on the one hand, and 
heteronomous and encumbered selves, on the other. The encum- 
bered self may be at the heart of Sandel's vision of a self-governing 
republic, but it must be a self that is properly encumbered, ca- 
pable of critical reflection and judgment, and autonomous in the 
sense of being able to participate in the government of the repub- 
14. I develop this conception in "Politics and the Pursuit of Autonomy," 
NOMOS XXVIII: Justification in Politics, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman 
(New York: New York University Press, 1986), and in Civic Virtues: Rights, 
Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
esp. chap. 3. 
15. I owe this point to two anonymous reviewers for the Review of Politics. 
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lic. A self that is incapable of reconsidering its ends and attach- 
ments, subjecting them to scrutiny, and revising or even rejecting 
them simply could not handle the burdens of deliberation that 
Sandel's "multiply-situated selves" and "multiply-encumbered 
citizens" must bear (DD, p. 350). 
Loyalty, Solidarity, and the Problem of Obligation 
Encumbered or not, Sandelian citizens must be able to think- 
and to choose-for themselves. If this is not already evident, 
consideration of Sandel's views on the obligations of membership 
should make the point plain. 
One of the failings of "the image of the unencumbered self," 
according to Sandel, is that it "cannot make sense of our 
experience, because it cannot account for certain moral and 
political obligations that we commonly recognize, even prize. 
These include obligations of solidarity, religious duties, and other 
moral ties that may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice" 
(DD, p. 13). The liberal emphasis on individuals who freely choose 
to place themselves under obligations may account for obligations 
arising from contracts and other voluntary agreements; it may even 
accommodate the "natural duties," as Rawls calls them, that we owe 
to everyone, remote stranger as well as neighbor or kin. But this 
liberal attempt to construe all obligation in terms of duties universally 
owed or obligations voluntarily incurred makes it difficult to account 
for civic obligations and other moral and political ties that we commonly 
recognize. It fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose 
moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable 
from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-as 
members of this family or city or nation or people, as bearers of that 
history, as citizens of this republic. Loyalties such as these can be more 
than values I happen to have, and to hold, at a certain distance. The 
moral responsibilities they entail may go beyond the obligations I 
voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to human beings as 
such. (DD, p. 14)16 
Although he does not delve far into these matters, Sandel 
plainly believes that membership and identity are sufficient to 
16. Cp. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179, and "Procedural 
Republic," p. 23. 
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ground many obligations, including "certain moral and political 
obligations that we commonly recognize, even prize." In arguing 
for these "obligations of membership" or "obligations of solidar- 
ity," he places himself in company that includes at least two 
professed liberals, Ronald Dworkin and Yael Tamir.17 Whether that 
means that the appeal to loyalty is not the threat to liberalism 
Sandel takes it to be or that some liberal thinkers have seen the 
light and have moved in a Sandelian direction is a question I shall 
not address here, save to note that one can apparently move in a 
Sandelian direction without forsaking liberalism. Instead, I shall 
argue that Sandel's appeal to obligations of solidarity is in one 
way right, but in another quite wrong. 
Sandel is right to point out that loyalty and the sense of 
obligation are important moral and political concerns. Anyone 
who has ever condemned parents who abandon their children or 
criticized children who ignore their aged and infirm parents will 
agree that some of our responsibilities are simply not chosen. 
Anyone who has ever tried to stir people to action or to rally them 
to confront a challenge knows that a sense of belonging, of 
common membership in the group, is vital to success. A republic 
in which this sense of solidarity or obligation is weak, to put the 
point in terms of Sandel's political concerns, must be weak itself. 
So it is indeed important to foster and cultivate this sense of 
identification and loyalty among the citizens. 
Sandel goes wrong, however, when he takes the sense of 
obligation for the obligation itself. Someone may have a sense of 
obligation, even a powerful sense of obligation, without truly 
being under the obligation in question. In Dickens's Martin 
Chuzzlewit, for example, Seth Pecksniff's assistant, Tom Pinch, feels 
17. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986), pp. 186-216; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), chaps. 5 and 6. See also: Margaret Gilbert, "Group 
Membership and Political Obligation," The Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael 
Hardimon, "Role Obligations," The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 333-63; John 
Horton, Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 
International, 1992), chap. 6; and Bhikhu Parekh, "Citizenship and Political 
Obligation," in Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays, ed. Preston 
King (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 259-89. For criticism, see A. John Simmons, 
"Associative Political Obligations," Ethics 106 (1996): 247-73, and Christopher 
Heath Wellman, "Associative Allegiances and Political Obligations," Social Theory 
and Practice 23 (1997): 181-204. 
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an overwhelming obligation to Pecksniff, when all along Pecksniff 
is shamelessly exploiting Tom's innocent good nature. Conversely, 
someone may be subject to an obligation that he or she has no 
sense of at all. A man who fathers a child without knowing it 
provides a case in point, for he has an obligation to the child and 
its mother, ceteris paribus, even though he has absolutely no sense 
of this obligation. From either direction, the difference between 
the sense of obligation and the obligation itself undercuts the 
argument from membership or identification. The fact that people 
feel themselves to be under an obligation to their polity does not 
mean that they are under such an obligation, nor does the fact 
that they feel no such obligation mean that they are not. 
This appeal to the sense of obligation is especially troublesome 
for Sandel because it threatens his attempt to distance himself 
from communitarians who are willing to accept "the values or 
preferences that prevail in any given community at any given 
time."'8 As a republican, Sandel must acknowledge that the val- 
ues or preferences of some communities are hostile to the 
republican ideal of self-government. When he invokes the claims 
of membership, identity, and solidarity, however, he seems to say 
that anyone who feels a sense of obligation to any group or com- 
munity, no matter how despotic or exploitative it may be, does 
indeed have an obligation to that group or community. He does 
admit, as previously noted, that "bad communities may form bad 
characters," but he has no recommendation for handling those 
whose "bad characters" lead them to believe that they ought to 
be loyal to their "bad communities." 
To be sure, Sandel does not insist that these obligations of 
membership and solidarity are absolute. Presumably they may 
be overridden by more pressing moral and political claims. But 
how are we to know what these more pressing claims are? The 
appeal to membership and solidarity by itself offers no criteria 
for weighing or discriminating between competing claims. What 
seems to matter most is the degree to which one identifies with 
this group or community in comparison with that group or com- 
munity, as in Sandel's example of Robert E. Lee choosing to stand 
by "'my native State and share the miseries of my people.'"'9 But 
18. Sandel, "Political Liberalism," p. 1767. 
19. As quoted in Democracy's Discontent, p. 15. 
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how was Lee to determine that Virginia rather than the United 
States was his true country? His sense of loyalty resolved the ques- 
tion in favor of Virginia, but the subsequent creation of West 
Virginia indicates that other Virginians evidently found their sym- 
pathies pulling them in the other direction. Should he even have 
given his "native State" such weight in light of its reliance on the 
vicious practice of slavery? Even if we acknowledge that Lee did 
have an obligation of solidarity to his "people," it is by no means 
clear that he should have given such weight to a "native State" 
that endorsed such a practice. 
The point, then, is that the sense of obligation is indeed im- 
portant, but this sense is neither the sole nor a sufficient guide to 
proper conduct. Solidarity and loyalty are good things in the same 
way that the disposition to follow orders is a good thing. When 
the members of a group are engaged in a cooperative enterprise 
that seems to contribute to the good of the members, at least in 
the long term, then solidarity and loyalty help to reinforce the 
cooperation necessary to the group's success. But when the group 
relies on indoctrination and manipulation to provide benefits to 
some at the expense of the systematic exploitation of others, soli- 
darity and loyalty may simply perpetuate the injustice. The sense 
of obligation may be important, but not as important as the obli- 
gation itself. 
A theory of political obligation, in particular, requires more 
than the appeal to membership and solidarity can provide. 
Following Locke's observation in the Second Treatise of Government 
(?211) that the government may be dissolved without dissolving 
the society, one can easily admit to membership in a community 
or society without acknowledging an obligation to obey the 
commands of those who hold power. Those who engage in civil 
disobedience do not have to renounce their citizenship or admit 
to being disloyal, for they may claim that they are holding the 
rest of the community to its own ideals. Or they may even claim 
that they are working to raise the standards of the community to 
a higher standard. This is why Sandel's discussion of "the civil 
rights movement of the 1950s to the mid-1960s" as "the finest 
expression of republican politics in our time" is so strained (DD, 
pp. 348-49). There were indeed republican elements to the 
movement, such as "acting collectively to shape the public world" 
(DD, p. 348). This collective action required a sense of solidarity, 
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of course, but the appeal to solidarity was surely not sufficient for 
the success of the movement. Solidarity with whom? With other 
African Americans? If Martin Luther King and the other civil rights 
leaders could invoke racial solidarity in an attempt to defeat 
segregation, so could the segregationists in an attempt to defend 
it. Solidarity with all Alabamans, or Georgians, the majority of 
whom wanted to keep things as they were? Solidarity with all 
citizens of the United States, for many of whom the events in the 
South were simply an irritating distraction? To make their case, 
the leaders of the civil rights movement had to move beyond 
solidarity to universal claims, as Sandel acknowledges, "about 
vindicating individual rights against the prejudices of local 
communities, about respecting persons as persons, regardless of 
their race, religion, or other particular characteristics" (DD, p. 348). 
They also had to argue that no one had an obligation to obey laws 
that denied him or her these basic rights, member of the 
community or not. They needed, in short, a theory of political 
obligation that went beyond membership and solidarity to 
considerations of rights, justice, and fair play. 
When he turns to the discussion of his pluralist version of 
republicanism in the last chapter of Democracy's Discontent, Sandel 
lays particular stress on the need for "multiply-situated selves" 
and "multiply-encumbered citizens" to weigh and balance the 
various claims made on them as best they can. "The civic virtue 
distinctive to our time," he remarks, "is the capacity to negotiate 
our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting 
obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which 
multiple loyalties give rise" (DD, p. 350). Failure to sustain this 
tension will send us either into fundamentalism, for those who 
seek the certainty of simple answers, or into the formlessness of 
"storyless selves, unable to weave the various strands of their 
identity into a coherent whole" (DD, p. 350). If these are the only 
alternatives, then Sandel is right to tell us that we must learn to 
sustain the tension of multiple loyalties. But we must also 
recognize that people living with this tension must still make 
choices and decisions, and the sense of obligation is not, as I have 
argued, always sufficient to the task. We do indeed need some 
sense of what we owe to others, of the unchosen attachments and 
memberships that help to make us who we are. But we must also 
have some sense of what makes those to whom we are attached 
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worthy of our respect, gratitude, and loyalty. Without some 
guidance of this kind, we will not be able to determine who is 
most worthy when the difficult choices confront us. 
At these times we will need to be able to look beyond or be- 
neath the obligations of membership and solidarity, as those 
engaged in the civil rights movement did. We will need principles 
that allow us to adapt universal prescriptions to particular cir- 
cumstances. And we will need to recognize that other people, 
including perhaps many we have never known, have made it 
possible for us to rise at least a bit above our encumbrances and 
to gain a measure of autonomy. To those people we will have an 
obligation founded in gratitude and fairness that transcends the 
obligations of membership. 
Republicanism versus Liberalism? 
The procedural republic that has unfolded over the past half- 
century can now be seen as an epic experiment in the claims of liberal 
as against republican political thought. Our present predicament lends 
weight to the republican claim that liberty cannot be detached from 
self-government and the virtues that sustain it, that the formative 
project cannot be dispensed with after all. The procedural republic, 
it turns out, cannot secure the liberty it promises because it cannot 
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires. 
(DD, p. 323; emphasis added) 
This passage from the concluding chapter of Democracy's 
Discontent neatly expresses the main argument of the book. The 
United States began as a country dedicated to republican self- 
government, but liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights 
and a government neutral with regard to competing conceptions 
of the good, has largely supplanted republicanism in the last half- 
century or so. Yet the victory of liberal political theory must be a 
hollow one, for the liberalism of the procedural republic "cannot 
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government 
requires." Liberalism has won, at least for now, but it will lead us 
all to defeat unless republicanism revives and regains 
the ascendancy. 
For the most part Sandel is careful to direct his attack against 
a "version" of liberalism rather than liberalism simpliciter. On page 
four, for instance, he declares that the "political philosophy by 
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which we live is a certain version of liberal political theory." At 
one point he even seems to admit the possibility of a "more civic- 
minded liberalism" that "would seek communal provision less 
for the sake of distributive justice than for the sake of affirming 
the membership and forming the civic identity of rich and 
poor alike" (DD, p. 333). But there is no denying that the opposi- 
tion that informs his book is the opposition of liberalism 
to republicanism. 
As others have noted, Sandel works so hard to distinguish 
republicanism from liberalism historically as well as conceptually 
that he produces a highly suspect-first came republicanism, then 
came liberalism-and tendentious account of American history.20 
This account is particularly surprising in light of this statement 
from one of the sources Sandel cites: "Logically, it may be 
inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and classical [i.e., classical 
republican]. Historically, it was not."21 
I am less concerned with Sandel's history, however, than with 
his assumption that the claims of liberal must be set against those 
of republican political thought. Rather than make this assump- 
tion, we should pause to consider whether republicanism and 
liberalism share enough features to make a hybrid possible, 
perhaps in the form of a "more civic-minded liberalism" that 
might be called republican liberalism. I believe that they do, and 
I believe that Sandel's position rests on an implicit appeal to such 
a hybrid. As his discussion of the civil rights movement indicates, 
for instance, the political activity and attitudes that Sandel 
endorses embrace both republican and liberal convictions. 
Individual rights, fair play, and tolerance are as integral to his 
vision of the good polity as the sense of community and civic 
duty. When he insists on distinguishing "the claims of liberal as 
against republican political thought," though, he threatens to 
undercut his own position. At the least his sharp distinction makes 
opponents of liberals who otherwise might be persuaded to see 
20. See the reviews of Democracy's Discontent by Susan Okin (American Political 
Science Review 91 [1997]: 440-42) and Mark Hulliung (The Responsive Community 
7 [1997]: 68-72). 
21. Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical 
Ideas in the New American Republic," William and Mary Quarterly 43 (1986): 12. 
Sandel cites this article in note 33, p. 372. 
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how their own commitments require them to accord greater value 
and attention to republican principles. 
The way to avoid these problems, as I have said, is to look to 
a hybrid of republicanism and liberalism. But is such a hybrid 
possible as well as desirable? I shall now try to show that it is. 
If liberalism is a form of political thinking that places the 
greatest value on individual rights and personal autonomy, 
republicanism is frequently distinguished from it as a rival theory 
that accords the greatest value to civic virtue and responsible self- 
government.22 Autonomy and civic virtue are often taken to be at 
odds with one another because personal autonomy requires people 
to look inward so that they may govern themselves, while civic 
virtue demands that they look outward and do what they can to 
promote the common good. The two are different from each other, 
of course; they are even in tension with each other at times. But 
they appear to be incompatible only to those who conceive of 
autonomy as a purely individualistic notion, as Sandel does, and 
of civic virtue as a strictly collectivist or communitarian ideal. 
But this is to overlook the important ways in which the two 
concepts, one supposedly liberal and the other republican, connect 
with each other. 
In classical republican thought, civic virtue-the disposition 
to place the good of the community above one's personal good- 
contains three primary elements: the fear of corruption, the hatred 
of dependence, and the desire for liberty. 
Corruption could take the passive form of shirking one's civic 
duties in favor of indolence or the life of luxury, or it could take 
the active form of advancing one's personal interests at the ex- 
pense of the common good, as when ambition and avarice tempt 
someone to overthrow the rule of law and establish a tyranny in 
its place. 
The second ingredient of republican virtue, the fear of depen- 
dence, follows from the Aristotelian conception (The Politics, 
1283b42-1284a3) of the citizen as someone who rules and is ruled 
in turn. The person who is utterly dependent on another person 
may be ruled, but is surely in no position to rule. The rule of law 
is essential, therefore, as a means of avoiding personal dependence. 
In a government of laws, not of men, in the classical formulation, 
22. The following discussion is adapted from my Civic Virtues, pp. 13-18. 
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the citizen is subject to laws, not to the demands and whims of 
rulers who act without restraint. The republican defense of pri- 
vate property as a way of guaranteeing that the citizen's home 
and livelihood will not depend completely on the vagaries and 
interests of another also reflects this fear of dependence. Some 
republican thinkers, such as Harrington and Rousseau, have also 
suggested that property should be distributed in such a way as to 
prevent anyone from being so wealthy as to render other citizens 
dependent-a worry about the consequences of civic inequality 
reflected in the last chapter of Democracy's Discontent. 
This fear of dependence leads to the third element of the 
republican conception of civic virtue: independence, or liberty.23 
The virtuous citizen must be free, but not simply free to go his or 
her own way. Instead, the citizen is free when he or she participates 
in the government of his or her community. As part of the 
community, the citizen will recognize that the government of 
common affairs is more or less directly self-government. If self- 
government requires the occasional sacrifice of one's personal 
interests, so be it, for the sacrifice is necessary to preserve the 
liberties of the citizen of a self-governing polity. 
These features of republican virtue are all present in the 
republicanism of Democracy's Discontent. The question to consider 
now is whether the revival of civic virtue so conceived is 
compatible with the supposedly liberal desire for personal 
autonomy or altogether at odds with it. The autonomous person 
adopts the principles by which he or she will live, which implies 
some degree of critical reflection on the principles available. With 
civic virtue, however, the emphasis is on acting, perhaps without 
reflection, to promote the common good. The unquestioning 
soldier who makes "the ultimate sacrifice" on behalf of his or her 
country provides a striking example. It is easy enough to see, then, 
how autonomy and civic virtue can seem to be at odds, for it is 
certainly possible for someone to exhibit civic virtue without being 
autonomous, just as it is possible for an autonomous person to 
act in a thoroughly selfish manner. 
23. For a valuable account of and argument for the republican conception of 
liberty as "nondomination," see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), esp. part 1. Note also Pettit's 
"Reworking Sandel's Republicanism," The Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 73-96. 
203 
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 
But this is to say that civic virtue and personal autonomy are 
different from each other and that they sometimes tug us in dif- 
ferent directions, not that they are incompatible. Properly 
understood, autonomy and civic virtue turn out to be related con- 
cepts that can and should complement each other. Another look 
at the three principal elements of republican virtue should begin 
to make their compatibility clear. 
First, the republicans' fear of corruption is largely a fear of 
human weakness. Indolence and love of luxury, ambition and 
avarice-these are vices that constantly beckon people to forsake 
their civic duties and disregard the claims of the common good. 
Staving off corruption requires mixed government and the rule 
of law and, according to some republicans, even the rotation of 
public offices among the citizenry and measures to prevent the 
concentration of wealth and property in the hands of a few. But 
these devices will never eradicate the threat of corruption, which 
stems from selfish and ultimately self-defeating desires implanted 
in human nature. The best hope lies in "the education of desire" 
or, more optimistically, in an appeal to "the compulsion of duty."24 
To teach people to hold their passions in check and to cultivate 
devotion to the common good is indeed to engage in a "forma- 
tive project," as Sandel puts it. But it is also to help them achieve 
a form of self-government. In this respect, civic virtue and au- 
tonomy have something in common. 
The second element in republican virtue exhibits another 
connection with autonomy. In this case, the republican distinction 
between dependence and independence has a direct counterpart 
in the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy. The 
connection is perhaps clearest in the works of Rousseau, who 
inspired Immanuel Kant, the philosopher most often identified 
with the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy-and 
forebear of the Kantian or deontological liberals who have brought 
us, according to Sandel, into the procedural republic. In Emile, 
Rousseau draws a distinction between 
two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature, 
and dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, 
24. Shelley Burtt, "The Good Citizen's Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic 
Virtue," Polity 23 (1990): 23-38. 
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since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and 
engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order, 
engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually 
corrupted. If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to 
substitute law for man and to arm the general will with a real strength 
superior to the action of every particular will.25 
Here Rousseau proclaims that the only way to overcome "depen- 
dence on men," and thus to promote freedom, is to rely on the 
impartial rule of law and the general will. If the rule of law frees 
people from dependence on others, they will be free to make laws 
in accordance with the general will that they share as citizens. 
This freedom, as Rousseau says in the Social Contract (Book I, Chap- 
ter 8), is "moral liberty," that is, living in accordance with laws 
that one prescribes for oneself. Freeing people from dependence 
on others is thus necessary if they are to exercise autonomy. 
The connection between autonomy and civic virtue is perhaps 
most obvious with regard to the third element of republican virtue: 
the idea that liberty is participation in government and therefore 
is self-government. Since autonomy means self-government, one 
might say that the concept of civic virtue entails a commitment to 
autonomy, in some sense of the word. Again, this commitment is 
probably clearest in Rousseau's writings, as in the fundamental 
problem he sets out to solve in the Social Contract: "'Find a form 
of association that defends and protects the person and goods of 
each associate with all the common force, and by means of which 
each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and 
remains as free as before."'26 For Rousseau, in fact, it seems not 
only that civic virtue entails self-government, but that autonomy 
is possible only when civic virtue prevails. Unless the general will 
of the citizen takes precedence over the particular will of the man, 
to use his terms, no one can experience moral liberty. 
From the perspective of the republican conception of civic 
virtue, in short, autonomy and civic virtue are far from 
incompatible ideals. The same result emerges from a brief analysis 
of the concept of autonomy. Autonomy "has to be worked for," 
which leads some philosophers to regard it as "a character ideal or 
25. Rousseau, Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 85. 
26. Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters and trans. Judith R. 
Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53. 
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virtue."27 But autonomy is not something that one can achieve 
solely through individual effort. It may have to be worked for, 
but it also has to be cultivated and developed. An infant may have 
the innate capacity to lead a self-governed life, but this capacity 
must be nourished and developed by others before he or she can 
ever hope to be autonomous. Recognizing this, the autonomous 
person should also recognize a duty of some sort to those whose 
help has made and continues to make it possible for him or her to 
lead a reasonably self-governed life-a debt that might be called 
an "obligation of membership," or "solidarity," perhaps. If this 
help sometimes takes the form of more or less impersonal public 
assistance or cooperation, then the corresponding duty is a civic 
duty. Thus the autonomous person has a reason to exhibit civic 
virtue, at least when the community or polity as a whole plays a 
significant part in fostering personal autonomy. 
Perhaps the best way to put the point is to say that autonomy 
and civic virtue are complementary because both concepts help 
us to see how independence is related to dependence. The person 
who is completely dependent on others cannot be independent, 
yet even the independent person remains dependent on others in 
various ways. We are interdependent, in other words, and a proper 
understanding of autonomy and civic virtue leads us to recog- 
nize and appreciate this basic fact of life. 
Interdependent people do not always agree with one another, 
however, and their relationships are sometimes strained by 
tension. This is also true of autonomy and civic virtue. They 
sometimes pull in different directions, with autonomy leaning 
toward individual rights and civic virtue toward public 
responsibility. Yet even this tension is healthy. When autonomy 
pulls too hard in an individualistic direction, the appeal to civic 
virtue reminds us that both the development and the exercise of 
autonomy require the assistance and cooperation of others; when 
appeals to civic virtue threaten to jeopardize individual rights, 
the claims of autonomy remind us that the body politic ought to 
be a cooperative enterprise composed of individuals who have a 
right to lead a self-governed life. In this way the tension between 
autonomy and civic virtue leads to a healthy balance. This is the 
27. Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Positive and Negative Liberty 
(London: Croom and Helm, 1986), p. 9. 
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kind of balance reflected in the attitude of citizens who are willing 
to do their part for the common good as long as others are willing 
to do theirs. These citizens know that they and the other members 
of the body politic are interdependent: their cooperation helps to 
enhance others' autonomy, just as the cooperation of others helps 
to enhance theirs. They have a reason to exhibit civic virtue, then, 
at least when the body politic as a whole plays a significant part 
in fostering personal autonomy. 
The Sandelian republic aims at achieving a balance of this kind. 
But such a balance requires a recognition of the common ground 
that republicanism and liberalism share, and this ground will go 
unnoticed by those who only see "the claims of liberal as against 
republican political thought." 
Conclusion 
Michael Sandel is right. Republican self-government does 
require "a formative politics ... that cultivates in citizens the 
qualities of character that self-government requires" (DD, p. 6). 
He is also right to remind us that others throughout American 
history have thought so, especially those concerned with "the 
political economy of citizenship" whose preoccupation was the 
question, "what economic arrangements are most hospitable to 
self-government?" (DD, p. 124). And he is right to warn us against 
those who believe that the state must be neutral with regard to 
conceptions of the good life.28 But he is wrong, as I hope I have 
shown, when he insists that we can only make matters right by 
rejecting liberalism in favor of republicanism. 
To take this position is to ignore the ways in which liberalism 
and republicanism complement one another, as I have just argued. 
It is also to ignore those liberals who have also acknowledged the 
need for "a formative politics" that a commitment to neutrality 
cannot sustain, such as Joseph Raz, William Galston, Thomas 
Spragens, Shelley Burtt, and George Sher.29 
28. Or so I argue in Civic Virtues, chap. 11. 
29. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); 
William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Thomas Spragens, "The 
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More important, Sandel's persistent tendency to oppose 
republicanism to liberalism undercuts his own position. Perhaps 
the unencumbered self cannot sustain republican government, but 
neither can a thoroughly encumbered self; perhaps an individual 
bereft of a sense of obligation will not act to overcome injustice, 
but neither will the person who cannot see beyond the obligations 
of membership and solidarity. The United States may indeed be 
in search of a public philosophy, and the one it needs may indeed 
resemble Sandelian republicanism. If we are to find that 
philosophy, however, we must resist Sandel's attempt to divorce 
republican from liberal political thought and look instead for ways 
to revive the republican spirit of republican liberalism. 
Limitations of Libertarianism-Parts I and II," The Responsive Community 2 (1992), 
and "Communitarian Liberalism," in New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, 
Institutions, and Communities, ed. Amitai Etzioni (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1995); Shelley Burtt, "The Politics of Virtue Today: A Critique and 
a Proposal," American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 360-68; and George Sher, 
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